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Abstract 
Market work per person of working age differs widely across the OECD countries and there 
have been some significant changes in the last forty years.  How to explain this pattern?  
Taxes are part of the story but much remains to be explained.  If we include all the elements 
of the social security systems like early retirement benefits, sickness and disability benefits 
and unemployment benefits, then we can capture some aspects of the overall pattern but still 
a lot remains unexplained.  The story favoured by Alesina et al. (CEPR DP.5140, 2005) is 
that the nexus of strong unions, generous welfare and social democracy implies both high 
taxes and pressure in favour of work-sharing in response to adverse shocks.  This story, 
however, falls foul of the simple fact that most Scandinavian countries now do much more 
work than the French and Germans despite having stronger unions, more generous welfare, 
higher taxes and more social democracy.  Ultimately, we are forced into the position that 
there is no simple story.  Some of the broad patterns can be explained but there remain 
country specific factors which are hard to identify but lead to substantial differences from one 
country to another.  
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1.  Introduction 
In the early 1970s in France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States (US), more or less the same proportion of the population of working age were 
actually working (65-70 per cent).  And, on average, they were working roughly the 
same number of hours per year (1850-1950).  By contrast, in Sweden, more people 
were working (74 per cent) but much shorter hours per year on average (around 1650 
in 1973).  In Italy, many fewer people were working (55 per cent) but about the same 
average hours (1868 in 1970). 
 
Three decades later some things have changed a lot, others very little.  In France and 
Germany, average employment rates have fallen a little and average hours per year 
have fallen dramatically to just over 1400 hours.  In the UK employment rates are 
much the same but average annual hours have fallen slowly but steadily to below 
1700 hours.  In the US, the employment rate has risen a little and average annual 
hours have fallen a little.  Interestingly, US employees now work more hours per year, 
on average, than employees in any of the rich countries of the OECD1.  Little has also 
changed in Sweden over the last thirty years, with the employment rate remaining 
high and annual hours falling only very slightly.  Italy also still has an exceptionally 
low employment rate but annual hours here have fallen a fair bit (to around 1600) but 
not to the levels reached in France and Germany. 
 
Overall, as we shall see, the picture with regard to market work is quite complicated.  
Generally, the Scandinavians, along with the Dutch and Swiss have the highest 
employment rates.  The Americans, Australians and Japanese work more hours per 
year than the rest.  The Southern Europeans (and the Belgians) generally have the 
lowest employment rates but not the lowest annual hours which may be found in 
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.  Adding employment and 
hours together, we find that Americans, Australians and New Zealanders are the 
hardest workers, on average, and the French, Italians and Belgians work least hard2.  
The hardest working countries work about 40 per cent more than the least hard 
working. 
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The fact that this number is so large has instigated a significant body of research 
which has often focused on why, in particular, Americans work so much harder than 
the average European.  An empirical overview may be found in Nickell (1997) (Table 
2 and Table 7, col. 3) and this suggests that employment protection, taxes and unco-
ordinated unions tend to be associated with lower labour input.  On top of this, there is 
a great deal of empirical evidence on the determinants of overall employment rates 
including Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2002) and Nickell et al. (2003).  By and large, they 
come to similar conclusions, namely that unions, taxes and employment protection are 
associated with lower employment rates but if union activity is co-ordinated, the 
impact of unions and taxes is moderated.  Furthermore, there is some evidence that 
low levels of competition in product markets is also associated with low employment 
rates. 
 
More recently, Prescott (2004) argued that taxes are the key, explaining more or less 
all the variations in labour input across countries.  Davis and Henrekson (2004) also 
emphasise the importance of taxes.  Both these papers echo the results of Daveri and 
Tabellini (2000) who find that labour taxes can explain most of the fluctuations in 
unemployment in those countries which do not have co-ordinated pay bargaining.  
This strong emphasis on the role of labour taxes has been criticised on the grounds 
that it is inconsistent with the bulk of the cross-country evidence, basically because of 
omitted variable bias (Nickell, 2003), or on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the 
evidence on labour supply elasticities (Alesina et al., 2005). 
 
Alesina et al. (2005) then go on to note that labour inputs have fallen especially in 
countries characterised by strong unions, extensive welfare, high taxation and social 
democratic governments.  As they remark “The bottom line is that hours worked fell 
in countries that can be characterised by the Continental European model and did not 
fall in the countries with the American model (with Britain and Ireland in between)” 
(p.23).  The basic argument is that trade unions respond to adverse shocks by trying to 
protect employees, pressing for work sharing as well as employment protection more 
generally, which tends ultimately to reduce overall labour input.  This is reasonably 
plausible although the fact that Sweden, the home of social democracy, strong unions 
and the welfare state, has seen only very modest reductions in labour input over the 
last thirty years gives pause for thought.  Furthermore, Australia, where over 80% of 
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individuals still have their pay determined by union bargaining, has seen little or no 
reduction in labour input.  By contrast, in the UK, where both union membership and 
coverage have collapsed since 1980, annual working hours have fallen by 250 hours 
(14%) since 1973, whereas hours in Sweden fell by a mere 79 over the same period. 
 
In the light of this, it is perhaps worth pursuing the forces underlying fluctuations in 
the volume of market work per capita a little further.  In the next section, we look at 
the current overall picture and how it divides into annual hours and employment rates.  
We then look at the history of both these, emphasising the huge variations across the 
different countries.  In Section 3, we focus on changes in the participation rates of 
different sub-groups of the population, notably, prime-age men and women as well as 
older men.  We also consider overall unemployment rates.  In Section 4, we analyse 
annual working hours, trying to explain the large differences in the changes since the 
early 1970s.  Finally, in Section 5, we summarise our findings and provide a synthesis 
of the various explanations of changes in labour input over the last thirty years. 
 
2.  The Overall Picture 
In Table 1, we present a picture of labour input in 2002 in the richer OECD countries, 
showing the division between employment rates and hours.  The big three countries of 
Continental Europe (France, Germany, Italy) plus Belgium has the lowest input levels 
and many of the “Anglo-Saxon” economies plus Japan have the highest input levels.  
Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal and Finland tend towards the high input end 
of the spectrum.  Turning to the division between employment rates and annual hours, 
significantly more people work in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland than 
elsewhere.  The big countries of Southern Europe, Spain and Italy have many fewer 
people in work than the remainder.  Looking at annual hours, we see from column 3, 
annual hours tend to be high in the Anglo-Saxon economies and particularly low in 
the Netherlands and Norway with France and Germany on the low side. 
 
In Table 2, we divide annual hours into hours per week and weeks per year.  An 
alternative picture, based on different data, may be found in the Appendix.  Broadly 
speaking, the outcome is much the same although there are large differences for one 
or two countries.  Hours per week vary relatively little across countries except for the 
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Netherlands which has by far the highest number of part-timers.  More interesting is 
weeks worked per year, where there is much variation.  Weeks not worked generally 
consist of either of holidays and vacations or of absences due to sickness or maternity 
leave.  In practice, absences due to labour disputes, training and so on are of minor 
significance.  Looking first at vacations and holidays, what stands out is that these are 
between two and four weeks lower in the US than in any of the other countries.  This 
is possibly due to the differences in data sources, but it is also consistent with the fact 
that many workers in the US only have one or two weeks paid vacation per year, 
which would be illegal in nearly all OECD countries.  Unfortunately, we do not have 
comparable data for other non-European countries but we do know that Australian 
workers, for example, have a legal minimum of 5.8 weeks holiday and vacation time 
each year (see Table 15, below). 
 
Other absences are a residual and consist mainly of sickness or maternity leave.  
There is a good deal of variation here which may, in part, be due to measurement 
error.  The data in two tables in the Appendix present some alternative numbers which 
again show significant variations in sickness and maternity leave.  These we 
investigate further below.  Overall, we see that annual holidays and vacations are 
much the same in most countries with the notable exception of the United States.  On 
top of this there are wide variations in weeks of other absence, mainly sickness and 
maternity leave. 
 
Some History 
Having seen how labour inputs vary across countries, it is worth looking at how 
employment rates and annual hours worked have changed over the last three or four 
decades.  Starting with employment rates, a striking feature of the numbers in Table 3 
is that in the early 1970s, the pattern of employment rates across countries was much 
the same as it is today.  The Scandinavian countries plus Switzerland have always had 
the highest employment rates and still do.  Spain, Italy and Belgium have always had 
the lowest employment rates and still do.  Some countries have seen significant 
increases, most notably the Netherlands, with smaller increases in Norway, Canada, 
New Zealand and the US.  In every country, the employment rate of women has risen, 
by anything from 10 to 35 percentage points.  Finland is the exception here, partly 
because it had high rates of female participation even in the 1960s.  Typically, 
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therefore, the employment rates of men have declined over the same period.  Finally, 
of course, these employment rates have been affected by the dramatic fluctuations in 
unemployment in the 1970s to the early 1990s. 
 
Underlying this relatively stable pattern are some significant changes in the 
employment rates of a variety of different sub-groups which we shall pursue below.  
Turning to the history of annual hours in Table 4, the changes over the last three or 
four decades are much larger than the changes in the employment rates.  In 1970, in 
nearly all countries for which data are available, annual hours were typically between 
1850 and 1950.  However, in Sweden and Norway, annual hours were already well 
below this level despite a very buoyant demand for labour, with unemployment rates 
in the two countries being 1.2 and 1.6 per cent, respectively.  By 2004, some countries 
had seen dramatic changes.  In France, Germany and the Netherlands, annual hours 
fell by around 500 from 1970 to 2004, in Norway and Japan, the fall was around 400 
and in Ireland and the UK the fall was close to 300.  By contrast, in Sweden Australia, 
Canada and the US, the fall over this same period was between 100 and 150.  These 
differences are striking and we shall pursue them further below. 
 
In the next section we consider various components of the employment rate. 
 
3.  Aspects of the Employment Rate 
First, we can see in Table 5, how employment and inactivity rates differ across both 
men and women and different age groups.  We focus here on the over 25s because we 
do not wish to pursue questions about participation in education. 
 
There are a number of interesting features of Table 5 which are worth following up.  
First, while the employment rates of prime age men (25-54) do not appear to vary 
very much, there are some quite striking differences in inactivity rates for this group.  
Furthermore, the inactivity rate now exceeds the unemployment rate in nearly every 
country.  Second, the inactivity rates of older men (55-64) differ significantly across 
countries from Belgium, France, Italy and Austria where over half of older men are 
inactive to Sweden, Switzerland, Japan and New Zealand where less than one quarter 
are inactive.  Third, inactivity rates among prime age women are over 30 per cent in 
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Ireland, Italy, Spain and Japan and around 15 per cent in Scandinavia.  Interestingly 
enough, inactive women are not specifically looking after children.  Since the 1990s, 
the inactivity rates of women are inversely correlated with fertility rates across 
countries.  So in what follows, we focus on each of these three issues, starting with 
inactivity among prime age men. 
 
Inactivity among prime age men 
The history of this aspect of labour input is set out in Table 6.  Back in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, prime age male inactivity rates rarely exceeded 5% by any significant 
amount.  By 2004, only two countries have rates below 5%.  Countries where prime 
age men have inactivity rates exceeding 9% today include Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
UK, Australia and the US.  This is an odd group of countries because, by and large, 
they are noted for their relatively high levels of labour input.  Thus, by contrast, 
France and Germany have particularly low levels of prime age male inactivity and the 
EU average is only 7.6%.  The evidence which we have on this issue suggests that a 
significant proportion of these inactive men are categorised as long-term sick or 
disabled (European Labour Force Survey).  Furthermore, we know that the rules 
governing entry into the disability benefit system are crucial, because exit rates are 
generally very low.  In some countries, these rules were significantly weakened in the 
last thirty five years, in others not.  Thus in Bound and Burkhauser (1999), Table 17 
we find the following: 
 
Disability transfer recipients per 100 workers 
Age 15-44 45-59 
 1970 1995 1970 1995 
US 1.1 3.9 3.3 10.3 
Sweden 1.8 3.2 6.6 15.1 
Germany (W) 0.7 0.6 7.5 8.7 
 
So in the US and Sweden, the numbers more than double from 1970 to 1995 whereas 
in Germany they barely change.  In the UK, they rise even faster (see Faggio and 
Nickell, 2003). 
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Inactivity among older men 
The history of inactivity among older men is presented in Table 7.  Back in the early 
1970s, these inactivity rates rarely exceeded 25% with the notable exception of Italy.  
The situation here was exceptional because at that time Italian men were entitled to a 
generous public pension at age 60.  By the early 1990s, inactivity rates among older 
men exceeded 25% in all countries except Japan and were above 45% in many 
Continental European countries outside Scandinavia.  Why did this happen?  
Basically, much of this change can be explained by the increase in financial incentives 
to retire early.  And, by and large, these incentives were introduced to remove older 
workers from the labour force under the mistaken belief that this reduction in effective 
labour supply would help reduce high levels of unemployment.  For example, in 1979, 
Italy introduced “unemployment pensions” at age 57+, if unemployment was due to 
severe economic conditions or industrial reorganisation.  In France, unemployment 
benefits were paid to those over 56 with no requirements to seek work or retrain. 
 
Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) present a detailed analysis of the incentive issue and 
their panel data regressions reveal the importance of financial incentives in 
determining early retirement.  In the 1995 column in Table 7, we present, in 
parentheses, the estimated inactivity rates were pension systems to be made 
actuarially neutral up to age 64.  In many European countries, this makes a substantial 
difference.  Duval (2003) extends this work and in Table 8, we report the implicit tax 
rates on those working between 55 and 64 generated by the early retirement and 
pension systems.  Then, in Table 9, we show some of Duval’s regressions simply to 
illustrate the importance of implicit tax rates in determining early retirement.  For 
example, an implicit tax rate at age 60 of 50 per cent will generate a fall in 
participation of 8.5 per cent.  In the parentheses after the 1999 column in Table 7, we 
show Duval’s estimates of the inactivity rate were early retirement schemes to be 
removed and actuarial neutrality introduced up to 64.  Again, they show big effects 
for many countries taking the inactivity rates back to 1970s levels.  Interestingly, by 
2004, we can see that inactivity among older men has started to fall in a significant 
number of countries, particularly those where early retirement incentives have been 
reduced, notably Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
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Inactivity among prime age women 
The overall picture is provided in Table 10 and this shows that there has been a 
continuing fall in inactivity among prime age women in nearly every country.  But 
inactivity rates are still high in Ireland, Italy, Japan and Spain.  Indeed, far higher than 
in much of Scandinavia in the 1970s.  Furthermore, whereas in the 1970s, fertility was 
positively correlated with inactivity across OECD countries, it is now negatively 
correlated.  So in the low inactivity countries, women not only work more, they also 
have more children. 
 
Much micro-econometric work and the cross-country analysis in OECD (1990), 
Chapter 6 and Jaumotte (2003) suggest that marginal tax rates may be important here.  
So in Table 11, we present the marginal rates facing married women at zero hours and 
when they are earning 67% of average earnings given their spouses are earning 100% 
of average earnings.  Here, we see some significant cross-country variations, 
particularly at zero hours.  If, by some mechanism or other, married women have their 
own tax allowance, their marginal rate at zero hours will be zero.  At the other 
extreme, their earnings may simply be added to their husband’s for tax purposes, so 
their marginal rate will be the same as their husband’s.  It is plain that high marginal 
rates at zero hours generate a strong disincentive to working a low number of hours 
per week.  Even at more normal hours, however, there are large variations in marginal 
rates across countries. 
 
The implications of these and other variables may be found in the panel regressions 
explaining participation in Table 12.  Marginal tax rates have important effects, as 
might be expected, with 10 percentage point increases in both the rates included in the 
regression reducing participation rates by around 3 percentage points.  The strictness 
of employment protection laws on regular employment has a significant negative 
effect as does union density.  Introducing measures of business sector labour 
productivity and male unemployment in column 2 has little impact on the key 
variables noted above.  The negative impact of these new variables is not easy to 
interpret because they are potentially endogenous3.  They are only introduced because 
they have been included in other work (eg. OECD, 1990, Table 6.3 and Jaumotte, 
2003, Table 5) and it is worth checking that they do not change the key results.  The 
same argument applies to the inclusion of variables capturing public expenditure on 
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children and parental leave.  These will also tend to be endogenous but their inclusion 
has little impact on the marginal tax rate and employment protection effects.  The 
impact of union density is, however, eliminated. 
 
Overall, marginal tax rates and employment protection seem to have relatively robust 
negative effects.  However, the time dummies in the regression in column 1 reveal a 
background rise in female participation by 14 percentage points and this is even 
bigger after we add in further variables in column 3.  The implication of this is that 
there are further factors driving female participation which we are not able to capture.  
Furthermore, looking at the trends in inactivity implicit in Table 10, it is plain that 
there are large differences across countries.  For example, there are very significant 
differences in apparent preferences about part-time work.  This is important, because 
a willingness to work part-time clearly helps in obtaining a job.  In Table 13, we show 
the percentage of these who work part-time and the percentage of these who do so 
voluntarily.  Thus in Finland and Spain, few women work part-time despite married 
women facing zero marginal tax rates at zero hours.  Furthermore, around half of 
these do so “involuntarily”.  By contrast, in the Netherlands, more than half the 
working women are part-timers and the vast majority of them wish to be so. 
 
In summary, we can identify certain variables such as marginal tax rates and 
employment protection, which impact on the participation rates of prime age women.  
But explaining why the vast majority of prime age women in Scandinavia were active 
in the labour market by the early 1970s when only a small minority were 
economically active in Italy and the Netherlands, and why the changes in subsequent 
decades differ so much, is not easy on the basis of standard economic variables.  In all 
the countries, there are a number of causally interacting trends among women going at 
different speeds in different countries – rising education, falling fertility, rising 
participation, rising expenditures on child care, rising productivity, rising wages.  
Sorting out these interactions remains to be done. 
 
Overall unemployment rates 
Since a great deal is known about the subject (see Nickell, 2003 or Nickell et al., 2005 
for example), we comment only briefly on overall unemployment rates.  In Table 14, 
we show the overall trends.  The basic picture is one where unemployment rose across 
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the OECD from the 1960s to the early 1980s, peaking then or in the early 1990s 
before falling back to 1970s levels in most countries or remaining stubbornly high in 
some, notably the big four of continental Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Spain).  In 
2004, around half of the European countries in our list had lower unemployment than 
the United States, thereby emphasising that only a part of Europe suffers from the 
slightly mythical “European unemployment problem”. 
 
To avoid high levels of unemployment, the following policies seem to work.  First: a 
social security system which concentrates on placing individuals in jobs.  It is 
important that specific people in the employment service are responsible for specific 
workless individuals.  Further, employees of the employment service must be well 
trained and have the correct incentives.  They can employ a mixture of carrots and 
sticks.  The actual level of benefits is not particularly important.  Second: having the 
right sort of wage determination system.  If there is a high level of collective 
bargaining coverage, some degree of co-ordination of bargaining is required.  High 
coverage alongside low union membership as well as decentralised and adversarial 
bargaining typically results in high unemployment.  Also helpful are relatively low 
labour taxes and the absence of very strict employment protection legislation.  Finally, 
a deregulated service sector helps to sustain a buoyant labour market when, 
inevitably, manufacturing employment is on a downward trend. 
 
This completes our discussion of the important factors determining employment rates.  
We next turn to hours worked per year by the employed. 
 
4.  Annual Hours Worked by the Employed 
Despite the huge variations in annual hours worked by the employed4 across the 
OECD, less is known about this than about employment rates.  As we have already 
seen in Table 4, except for Sweden and Norway where female participation was very 
high, annual hours in 1970 were between 1850 and 1950 in most countries for which 
data are available.  Since that time, annual hours have fallen by anything from 100 to 
150 in Sweden, Australia, Canada and the US to around 500 in France, Germany and 
the Netherlands.   
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We have already noted that variations in annual hours are driven, in the main, by 
holidays and paid vacations and by sickness and parental leave.  Looking over time, 
we see from Table 15 that in many countries there has been a significant increase in 
the minimum annual paid leave governed by legislation.  In both Italy and the UK, 
there was no legislation until the late 1990s when the European Working Time 
Directive (November 1993) was incorporated into national legislation.  By and large 
this made little difference in practice because annual paid holiday typically exceeded 
four weeks in Italy and even as far back as 1981, average annual weeks of holiday for 
manual workers in the UK was 4.2 (see OECD, 1990, Table 6.1).  Perhaps the most 
noteworthy point is that the US is unique among the developed OECD countries in 
having no legal minimum to annual paid leave. 
 
Another contributory factor to changes in annual hours is the incidence of part-time 
work.  This is not, of course, an explanation of changes in annual hours since it is 
merely one of the mechanisms by which the hours which people choose to work are 
expressed.  In Table 16, we see the history of part-time employment.  In many 
countries, there has been an increase in part-time employment, but it remains below 
20 per cent in most countries.  The UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Japan and 
Australia have a significant proportion of part-time employment, mainly among 
women.  Southern Europe generally has the lowest level of part-time work. 
 
Turning to sickness and maternity leave, in Table 17 we present information on the 
percentage of employees in receipt of publicly provided sickness and maternity 
benefit.  Interestingly, in many countries we see that this percentage has fallen from 
1980 to 1999.  Then in Table 18, column 1, we convert this into average weeks of 
leave which we then compare with some other measures.  These are reasonably 
closely correlated although the fact that the average weeks in receipt of benefits 
exceeds the absence measure provided by Alesina et al. (2005) for the US suggests the 
latter is understated.  Nevertheless, there are significant differences across countries in 
the amount of sickness/maternity absence and, presumably, a significant proportion of 
those differentials is due to the variations in the rules governing benefit payments. 
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So legislation on paid vacation leave and sickness/maternity benefits obviously has 
some impact on working hours, but what about the underlying forces at work, 
including those which drive the legislation? 
 
In Table 19, we present some panel regressions.  Looking first at the tax variables, 
there is a positive impact on hours from the marginal rate facing women on zero hours 
where their husband is working.  This is consistent with the fact that high marginal tax 
rates at zero hours discourage low hours jobs.  By contrast, the marginal rate facing 
married women with working husbands earning two-thirds of the average wage has a 
negative impact on hours as might be expected.  The same applies to the average tax 
wedge.  However, the marginal tax rate facing a single earner appears to have a small 
positive effect, although it is hardly robust.   
 
Employment protection has, if anything, a negative impact on hours, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that impressing managers with long hours is less of a requirement if 
jobs are secure5.  Despite this, union density appears to have a robust positive impact 
on hours, consistent with the results reported in Bowles and Park (2005), Table 1, 
Column I.  This is, however, inconsistent with the emphasis placed on the idea that 
trade unions encourage shorter working hours by Alesina et al. (2005). 
 
The strong positive role of earnings dispersion also confirms the results of Bowles and 
Park (2005).  In their view, this is strong evidence in favour of the “Veblen 
hypothesis”.  The idea here, espoused in The Theory of the Leisure Class by Thorsten 
Veblen (1934), is that households consume goods not only for their own sake but to 
impress their neighbours.  This, of itself, will tend to raise working hours and if 
earnings are more dispersed, additional work effort is required to make the 
appropriate impression6.  An alternative hypothesis, put forward by Bell and Freeman 
(2001), is that increased earnings dispersion induces longer hours because it raises the 
incentives to work harder in order to get promoted and move up the earnings rankings.  
Whatever the driving force, there does appear to be a strong effect of earnings 
dispersion on working hours. 
 
Earnings dispersion itself is, of course, influenced by labour market institutions, even 
when the dispersion of skills is taken into account.  For example, Nickell (2004) 
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reports a simple cross-country regression which finds that the 90/10 earnings ratio is 
significantly negatively influenced by union coverage even when controlling for skill 
dispersion captured by the dispersion of test scores reported in the International Adult 
Literacy Survey (OECD, 2000).  Koeniger et al. (2004), in a more extensive analysis, 
find that both trade union density and employment protection tend to reduce earnings 
dispersion and hence hours.  This indirect effect of union density via earnings 
dispersion is -0.167 which does not quite offset the positive union density effect in 
column 2. 
 
Overall, therefore, we find that various aspects of the tax system, employment 
protection and union density impact on working hours.  Perhaps the only surprising 
result is that union density is positively related to hours, even when taking account of 
its negative impact on earnings dispersion. 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The data we have been analysing are summarised in Table 20, where we show the 
history of labour input in the OECD countries.  Before discussing various stories, it is 
worth remarking at the outset that simply comparing the US with “Europe” is a 
hopeless strategy because European labour markets are highly diverse.  A second 
point to bear in mind is that large macroeconomic shocks have distorted the labour 
input series for some countries in some periods.  Thus, in France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK, there were particularly adverse macroeconomic 
shocks between 1973 and 1983.  The same applies to Finland and Sweden in the early 
1990s.  By contrast, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain were subject to strong 
favourable shocks in the 1990s. 
 
The first story which is frequently used to explain cross-country variations in labour 
input is based on labour taxes, a recent example being Prescott (2004).  The evidence 
we possess indicates that taxes cannot be the whole story.  The tax story is 
inconsistent with the tax effects on labour inputs generated by microeconometric 
studies (Alesina et al. 2005) and those generated by cross-country studies (Nickell, 
2003).  For example, if we apply the tax data to the annual hours regressions in Table 
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19, we find that the contribution of tax changes to the changes in annual hours from 
the early 1980s to the late 1990s is very small, probably less than 10 per cent. 
 
A second story would be in the same spirit as the tax story but adding in all the other 
elements of the social security system including early retirement benefits, sickness 
and disability benefits, unemployment benefits and so on.  As we have seen, these are 
certainly good at explaining the changes in some aspects of the labour input, notably 
inactivity among men, both prime age and old, as well as a part of the changes in 
unemployment and female participation.  But shifts in annual working hours are a 
major part of the story and here, while labour taxes have a significant impact, they 
explain only little of the overall picture.  
 
A third story is that favoured by Alesina et al. (2005) who argue that the nexus of 
strong unions, generous welfare benefits and social democratic governments imply 
both high taxes and direct pressure towards less work.  This latter is partly driven by 
work-sharing in response to adverse shocks and partly by the not unreasonable belief 
that long holidays are a good thing for workers, hence laws governing minimum 
levels of paid annual leave.  In practice, all developed OECD countries bar the US 
have such laws, even those such as New Zealand and the UK where unionisation has 
collapsed.  However, the work-sharing story applies clearly to Germany and 
particularly France, where incentives to reduce labour supply have consistently been 
applied in response to increases in unemployment, culminating in the imposition of 
the 35-hour week in France in the late 1990s. 
 
However, it is hard to see how the same story applies to Sweden which has stronger 
unions, more generous welfare benefits, higher taxes and more social democratic 
governments than either France or Germany.  Yet it has one of the highest 
employment rates in the OECD and only a small fall in labour input since the early 
1970s.  Thus, overall labour input in Sweden was 3% below that in France and 
Germany (average) in 1970 and 26% above in 2004.  Both Italy and the Netherlands 
also had only small falls in labour input from 1973 to 2004, but for very different 
reasons.  In both countries, labour input in 1973 was exceptionally low.  In Italy this 
was because female participation was very low, with an employment rate of around 
30%.  Furthermore, the retirement age was 60 for men and 55 for women, at least five 
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years younger than in any other European country.  For example, it was 67 for both 
men and women in Denmark and Sweden.  So it is no surprise that in 1973 and, 
indeed, even in the 1960s, Italy had the lowest employment rate in the OECD.  And it 
still does.  Add in only a modest fall in annual hours and we find only a small fall in 
overall labour input.  There is no strong element of work-sharing here.  Indeed, the 
Italian labour market model, with minimal welfare benefits and very strong 
employment protection, places a great deal of weight on the position of the male head 
of household, which is not to be undermined  either by the presence of a high earning 
wife or by the loss of a job.  Thus the unemployment rate of husbands at 2% was, in 
1992, among the lowest in the OECD (see OECD, 1994, Table 1.19). 
While the labour input in the Netherlands was also exceptionally low in 1973, the 
subsequent history is completely different.  The employment rate of women in 1973 
was extraordinarily low in the Netherlands at 28.6% but by 2004 it had risen to 
65.7%.  As a consequence the overall employment rate had risen by 17 percentage 
points, by far the largest increase in the OECD.  But the majority of women in 
employment in the Netherlands work part-time, so average annual hours fell 
dramatically.  The overall consequence of this was that the total labour input had 
barely changed by 2004. 
 
From all these different histories, it is clear that there is no simple story which can 
explain what is going on.  If we take groups of apparently similar countries, even then 
we find considerable within group variations.  For example, in the “Anglo-Saxon” 
group, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US, all have a high level of labour input 
at present.  Yet while Australia and Canada continue to have a strong union presence 
and Canadian labour taxes have risen significantly, their labour input has risen 
whereas, in the UK, union membership has collapsed since the 1970s and labour taxes 
have not increased, yet labour input has fallen by nearly 12% since 1973.  Compared 
to this group, the Scandinavian group Denmark, Finland, Sweden has, and always has 
had, very high employment rates, very strong unions and very rapid increases in 
labour taxes.  Yet their labour inputs have not fallen rapidly and are still only around 
10 per cent lower than in the Anglo-Saxon group.  By contrast, the major countries of 
Continental Europe, France and Germany, where unions are weaker and taxes have 
risen less rapidly, work-sharing strategies have been embraced wholeheartedly and 
labour inputs have fallen dramatically in the last thirty years. 
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The upshot of this is that there is no clear, simple story which will explain the cross-
country pattern of labour inputs over the last forty years.  The incentives embedded in 
the tax and social security systems of the different countries are clearly important and 
explain many features of the pattern.  But they are far from being the whole story.  
Trade unions, and indeed the population at large, have embraced work-sharing 
strategies in response to adverse shocks in France and Germany.  This has helped to 
drive down annual working hours by around 500 since the early 1970s.  This liking 
for work-sharing strategies is not, however, shared in the more corporatist societies of 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland perhaps because they have a different view of how the 
economy works (see Saint-Paul, 2004).  Here the tax/legal framework is used to 
enhance work/life balance, with very high labour force participation and relatively 
stable annual hours, which have fallen little over the last thirty years despite numerous 
adverse shocks. 
 
Broadly speaking, we can discern three groups of countries, Anglo-Saxon, 
France/Germany, Scandinavia where there is some sort of coherent story to be told 
about their pattern of labour input and the role of taxes, benefits, unions and other 
labour market institutions.  But further countries, such as Italy and the Netherlands, do 
not fit into any of these three groups, and different explanations of their labour input 
patterns are required.  Overall, while it is plain that the tax/benefit system and unions 
and other labour market institutions are important in explaining labour input patterns 
across the OECD, other factors are involved which are not easy to identify but lead to 
substantial differences from one country to another. 
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TABLE 1 
Hours per Working Age Person Per Week and its Components (2002) 
 1 
Weekly hours worked per 
person of working age 
(2x3 ÷ 100) 
2 
Employment/ 
Population of 
working age (%) 
3 
Annual hours 
actually worked 
by workers ÷ 52 
Austria 20.5 68.2 30.1 
Belgium 17.8 59.7 29.8 
Denmark 21.5 76.4 28.1 
Finland 22.5 67.7 33.2 
France 17.5 62.2 28.1 
Germany 18.2 65.3 27.8 
Ireland 20.8 65.0 32.0 
Italy 17.1 55.6 30.8 
Netherlands 19.1 74.5 25.7 
Norway 19.9 77.1 25.8 
Portugal 22.2 68.1 32.6 
Spain 20.8 59.5 34.9 
Sweden 22.8 74.9 30.4 
Switzerland 22.9 78.9 29.0 
UK 23.6 72.7 32.5 
Australia 24.3 69.2 35.1 
Canada 23.8 71.5 33.3 
Japan 23.6 68.2 34.6 
NZ 25.3 72.4 34.9 
US 24.9 71.9 34.6 
  
Sources:   
Employment/Population:  OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Table B. 
Annual Hours:  OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Table F. 
Some alternatives to these data are presented in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 2 
Annual Hours actually Worked and its Componentsa 
 1 2 3 4 5 
    Components of weeks worked 
 Annual hours 
actually 
worked by 
workers 
Average 
weekly hours 
by those in 
work 
Weeks worked 
per year by 
those in work 
(1 ÷ 2) 
Vacations and 
holidays 
Otherb 
absences 
(52-3.-4.) 
Austria 1567 38.4 40.8 7.2 4.0 
Belgium 1547 36.3 42.6 7.1 2.3 
Denmark 1462 36.3 40.3 7.4 4.3 
Finland 1726 38.8 44.5 7.0 0.5 
France 1459 36.2 40.3 7.0 4.7 
Germany 1443 36.5 39.5 7.8 4.7 
Ireland 1666 36.3 45.9 5.7 0.4 
Italy 1599 37.4 42.8 7.9 1.3 
Netherlands 1338 31.8 42.1 7.5 2.4 
Norway 1342 37.3 36.0 6.5 9.5 
Portugal 1697 40.4 42.0 7.3 2.7 
Spain 1813 38.8 46.7 7.0 (1.7) 
Sweden 1581 38.1 41.5 6.8 3.7 
Switzerland 1510 37.5 40.3 6.0 5.7 
UK 1692 38.2 44.3 6.5 1.2 
US 1800 39.4 45.7 3.9 2.4 
 
a.  The data refer to all workers, both full-time and part-time, and to full year equivalents.  So, hours  
     per year refers to those working a full year.  Numbers in parenthesis are negative. 
 
b.  Includes absences due to illness, maternity, labour disputes, training and other reasons.   
 
Sources: 
Column 1. OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Table F. 
Column 2. OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Table 1.5. 
              For US, Alesina et al. (2005), Table 1. 
Column 4. OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Table 1.5. 
                    For US, Alesina et al. (2005), Table 3. 
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TABLE 3 
Total Employment Rate (Women in brackets) % 
 
 1964 
 
1970 1973 1983 1990 2004 
Austria   64.4 (47.7) 62.9 (47.1)  66.5 (60.1) 
Belgium   60.7 (39.9) 54.6 (47.1) 54.4 (40.8) 60.5 (53.0) 
Denmark   75.2 (61.2) 71.1 (65.0) 75.4 (70.6) 76.0 (72.0) 
Finland 72.2 (61.4) 70.4 (61.5) 70.0 (62.3) 73.2 (69.0) 74.1 (71.5) 67.2 (65.5) 
France  66.6 (46.4) 65.9 (47.9) 60.8 (48.3) 60.8 (50.9) 62.8 (56.9) 
Germany  66.9 (46.3) 68.7 (49.7) 62.2 (47.8) 64.1 (52.2) 65.5 (59.9) 
Ireland   59.9 (32.8) 53.9 (33.6) 52.1 (36.6) 65.5 (55.8) 
Italy  52.0 (27.4) 55.1 (29.9) 54.5 (34.2) 52.6 (36.2) 57.4 (45.2) 
Netherlands   56.3 (28.6) 52.1 (34.7) 61.1 (46.7) 73.1 (65.7) 
Norway   67.7 (49.3) 73.9 (63.0) 73.0 (67.2) 75.6 (72.7) 
Portugal   62.4 (30.5) 65.8 (49.8) 67.4 (55.4) 67.8 (61.7) 
Spain   61.0 (32.5) 47.0 (26.4) 51.8 (31.8) 62.0 (49.0) 
Sweden 70.8 (53.0) 72.3 (58.3) 73.6 (60.8) 78.5 (73.9) 83.1 (81.0) 73.5 (71.8) 
Switzerland   77.7 (54.1) 73.8 (54.7) 78.2 (66.4) 77.4 (70.3) 
UK   71.4 (52.7) 64.3 (52.6) 72.5 (62.8) 72.7 (66.6) 
Australia   68.5 (46.4) 62.5 (47.0) 67.9 (57.1) 69.5 (62.6) 
Canada   63.1 (44.1) 63.8 (53.1) 70.3 (62.7) 72.6 (68.4) 
Japan  67.9 (52.8) 70.8 (53.4) 71.1 (55.7) 68.6 (55.8) 68.7 (57.4) 
NZ   64.4 (39.1) 61.6 (42.8) 67.5 (58.6) 73.5 (66.5) 
US 62.1 (40.6) 64.0 (46.3) 65.1 (48.0) 66.2 (56.1) 72.2 (64.0) 71.2 (65.4) 
 
 
Sources:   OECD Employment Outlook, 1995, Table A; 2005, Table B and OECD Labour Market Statistics 
Note:    Vertical lines reflect breaks in the series 
Definition:   Total employment ÷ population of working age (15-64) 
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TABLE 4 
Average Annual Hours Worked Per Person in Employment 
 
 1964 
 
1970 1973 1979 1983 1990 1995 
 
2004 
Austria        15503 
Belgium     1696 1690  1522 
Denmark     1597 1452  1454 
Finland 2075 1982 1915 1870 1823 1771  1736 
France 19391 1902 1846 1755 1663 1610 1558 1441 
Germany2 2081 1956 1869 1758 1692 1566 1494 1426 
Ireland     1902 1911 1823 1642 
Italy 1908 1868 1788 1697 1674 1656 1616 1585 
Netherlands1  1830 1724 1591 1530 1433 1359 1312 
Norway 1954 1784 1712 1514 1485 1432 1414 1363 
Portugal      1858 1799 1694 
Spain    2022 1912 1824 1815 1799 
Sweden 1852 1730 1642 1530 1532 1561 1626 1585 
Switzerland       1640 15563 
UK  1939 1923 1815 1713 1767 1734 1669 
Australia    1904 1853 1866 1872 1816 
Canada 2000 1892 1860 1800 1745 1757 1744 1751 
Japan   2201 2126 2095 2031 1884 1789 
NZ      1810 1842 1826 
US 2013 1936 1922 1861 1851 1861 1873 1824 
 
1 Dependent Employment 
2West Germany 
32003 
Source:  OECD Labour Market Statistics 
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TABLE 5 
Unemployment, Inactivity and Employment by Age and Gender in 2004 
 
 Unemployment (%) Inactivity Rate (%) Employment Rate (%) 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 
Europe             
Austria 4.3 4.7 4.4 4.1 8.6 61.4 20.6 80.7 87.4 36.8 75.8 18.5 
Belgium 6.0 4.1 7.4 2.8 8.9 59.0 25.7 78.2 85.7 39.3 68.8 21.2 
Denmark 4.4 5.5 5.1 5.8 8.7 26.7 15.1 42.4 87.3 69.3 80.6 54.2 
Finland 7.0 7.6 7.6 7.0 10.0 44.3 15.4 45.7 83.7 51.5 78.1 50.4 
France 7.4 5.5 9.8 7.1 6.4 55.7 20.2 65.0 86.7 41.9 72.0 32.5 
Germany 9.8 10.9 9.0 12.0 6.7 45.2 18.0 66.2 84.2 51.2 74.6 29.8 
Ireland 4.5 2.9 3.1 1.5 8.3 33.4 32.1 65.5 87.6 64.7 65.8 34.0 
Italy 5.2 4.1 9.2 4.0 8.7 56.0 36.4 79.6 86.5 42.2 57.8 19.6 
Netherlands 3.7 3.9 4.4 3.1 6.3 41.3 22.0 66.4 90.2 56.4 74.5 32.5 
Norway 4.3 1.5 3.3 0.6 9.9 25.7 17.2 36.9 86.2 73.2 80.0 62.7 
Portugal 5.1 6.0 7.1 5.1 7.8 37.2 19.4 55.2 87.4 59.1 74.9 42.5 
Spain 6.9 6.0 13.8 9.4 7.5 37.3 31.7 72.8 86.1 58.9 58.9 24.6 
Sweden 5.7 5.8 5.2 4.0 9.9 24.0 14.7 29.8 85.0 71.6 80.8 67.4 
Switzerland 3.5 3.1 4.6 3.4 4.3 20.9 19.2 44.3 92.3 76.7 77.1 53.8 
UK 3.8 3.9 3.4 2.1 9.0 32.0 23.2 51.7 91.0 68.0 74.2 47.3 
EU 6.5 6.2 8.3 6.4 7.6 44.8 24.5 65.5 86.4 51.8 69.2 32.3 
             
Non-Europe             
Australia 3.9 4.2 4.3 3.3 10.9 35.6 28.0 56.9 85.7 61.7 68.9 41.7 
Canada 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.7 8.4 34.0 18.4 51.0 86.0 62.0 76.8 46.2 
Japan 4.3 5.3 4.5 3.0 3.8 17.5 31.9 49.9 92.1 78.1 65.0 48.6 
NZ 2.5 2.4 3.3 2.6 8.4 21.8 24.8 40.4 89.4 76.4 72.7 58.1 
US 4.6 3.9 4.6 3.7 9.5 31.3 24.7 43.7 86.3 66.0 71.8 54.3 
 
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook 2005, Table C 
Notes:   (i) The inactivity rate equals 100 minus the participation rate. 
             (ii) These data do not include those in prison.  This makes little odds except in the US where counting those who are 
                   incarcerated would raise the inactivity rate among prime age men by close to 2 percentage points. 
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TABLE 6 
Inactivity Rates among Prime Age Men 
 
 1964 
 
1971 1979 1983 1990 1999 2004 
 
 
Austria      6.2 8.6  
Belgium    5.6 7.8 8.2 8.9  
Denmark    5.8 5.5 7.2 8.7  
Finland 4.7 7.2 7.7 6.5 7.1 9.4 10.0  
France 3.6 3.2 3.7 3.9 4.6 5.9 6.4  
Germany  3.7 5.1 5.7 8.8 6.4 6.7  
Ireland  2.8 5.0 4.4 8.2 8.4 8.3  
Italy  5.9 6.7 4.3 5.9 9.5 8.7  
Netherlands  5.1 7.0 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.3  
Norway   7.2 4.9 7.7 8.2 9.9  
Portugal   5.0 4.5 5.7 7.2 7.8  
Spain   4.4 5.5 5.6 7.1 7.5  
Sweden 3.7 5.3 4.7 5.0 5.3 9.7 9.9  
Switzerland     2.2 2.8 4.3  
UK  1.6a 2.5 4.6 5.2 8.4 9.0  
Australia  3.1 5.5 6.0 6.9 10.0 10.9  
Canada   5.1 6.3 6.9 8.9 8.4  
Japan 3.4 2.3 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.9 3.8  
NZ     6.6 8.9 8.4  
US 4.3 4.5 5.6 6.2 6.6 8.3 9.5  
EU 15       7.6  
a = 1972 
Source:  OECD Labour Market Statistics.  For the UK in 1972, we use the UK General Household Survey. 
Note:  Individuals in institutions are not included in these data.  The numbers are generally small except for men in the US who are incarcerated who comprise close to 2  
 per cent of the working population. 
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Table 7 
 
Inactivity Rate of Older Men, 55-64 
 
 1964 1971 1979 1990 1995 1999 2004 
        
Belgium   49.4 64.6 64.1 63.2 (51.0) 59.0 
Denmark   32.8a 30.9 32.1 38.1 26.7 
Finland 16.4 26.8 43.7 52.9 58.4 (44.8) 55.0 (42.2) 44.3 
France 20.6 25.4 30.1 60.7 58.8 (50.1) 57.3 (46.8) 55.7 
Germany  21.5 33.1 44.1 47.3 (35.4) 46.2 (34.1) 45.2 
Ireland  9.0 22.1 35.0 36.1 (30.8) 35.6 (25.0) 33.4 
Italy  40.7 62.4? 47.0 55.9 (35.8) 56.7 (55.0) 56.0 
Netherlands  19.4 34.7 54.2? 58.6 (49.6) 51.6 (31.1) 41.3 
Norway  16.7 18.0 27.2 27.7 (24.4) 25.5 (19.0) 25.7 
Portugal  18.3 24.4 33.5 39.3 (30.2) 36.0 (20.3) 37.2 
Spain  15.4 22.4 37.5 45.1 (39.9) 42.2 (27.8) 37.3 
Sweden 11.5 15.3 20.8 24.5 29.6 (25.0) 27.7 (22.7) 24.0 
UK  11.6 30.0a 31.9 37.6 (34.6) 36.5 (30.8) 32.0 
Australia  15.6 30.5 36.8 39.1 (39.1) 38.3 (34.4) 35.6 
Canada  16.7 23.7a 36.0 41.1 (39.7)  34.0 
Japan 13.5 12.9 14.8 16.7 15.2 (11.2) 14.8 (9.8) 17.5 
US 16.0 17.9  27.2 32.2 34.0 (31.1) 32.1 (30.0) 31.3 
 
? refers to a significant break in the series.  a = 1983. 
The figures in parentheses in the 1995 column refer to the estimated inactivity rate were the pension system to be made actuarially neutral up to age 64 (see Blondal and 
Scarpetta, 1998, Table V.6.) 
The figures in parentheses in the 1999 column refer to the estimated inactivity rate were early retirement schemes to be removed and actuarial neutrality to be introduced up 
to 64.  We use the average of low case and high case in Table 3 of Duval (2003). 
Sources:  OECD Employment Outlook.  Table C, various issues, Blondal and Scarpetta (1998). 
  Tables V.1 and V.6 and Duval (2003), Table 3.
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TABLE 8 
 
Implicit Tax Rates on Working for Five More Years (1999) (%) 
 
 At age 55 At age 60 
     
 Normal 
old age pension 
Early Retirement Normal 
old age pension 
Early Retirement 
     
Australia 1 1 1 1 
Belgium 9 57 47 72 
Canada 5 5 13 13 
Finland 12 70 22 75 
France -38 56 83 83 
Germany 10 48 24 51 
Ireland 16 37 16 37 
Italy 46 46 115 115 
Japan 6 6 39 39 
Netherlands 13 77 93 93 
Norway 15 15 15 28 
Portugal 4 52 14 76 
Spain 22 58 22 69 
Sweden 18 21 1 19 
UK 8 22 14 22 
US 5 5 5 5 
Source: Duval, R. (2003), Figures 4, 7, 8. 
Notes:  To compute implicit tax rates. 
• Define expected pension wealth/earnings at age R. 
= PWYR= ( ) ( ) Ri
Ri
ii rRs
−
=
+∑ 1/105  where 
=r  real interest rate, =is probability of being alive at age i  
conditional on being alive at R . 
• Define net change in expected pension wealth over 5 year period of working == RDPWY  
( )5 551 r
PWYs RR
+
++ - RPWY - ( ) ( ) RiiiR
Ri
rYCs −
+
=
+Σ 1//4  
=YCi /  total contributions to pension system over earnings at R . 
• Average implicit tax rate 5/RDPWY= .
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TABLE 9 
 
The Impact of Implicit Taxes on the Participation of Older Men 1967-99 
 
Dependent Variable Part.55-59-Part.50-54 
Part.50-54 
Part.60-64-Paret.55-59 
Part.55-59 
   
Implicit 
Tax Rate 
-0.11 
(7.2) 
-0.17 
(4.9) 
   
Unemployment 
Rate (age 25-54) 
-0.12 
(1.9) 
-0.90 
(6.0) 
   
Standard 
Retirement 
Age 
 1.63 
(3.3) 
 
   
Country effects 
Time effects 
Countries 
Observations 
2R  
√ 
√ 
22 
484 
0.92 
√ 
√ 
22 
471 
0.89 
 
 
Source: Duval, R. (2003), Table 2. 
Notes: =−
yPart
yPartxPart
.
..  change in participation rate from age y to age x as a proportion of the participation rate at age y . 
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TABLE 10 
 
Inactivity Rates Among Prime Age Women (%) 
 
 1964 1971 1979 1983 1990 1995 2004 
        
Belgium - - - 45.9 39.2 31.8 25.7 
Denmark - - - 16.0 12.2 17.9 15.1 
Finland 31.9 28.2 18.8 14.2 13.6 14.9 15.4 
France 54.1 49.1 37.0 33.0 27.8 22.7 20.2 
Germany - 51.8 44.6 41.7? 36.6? 27.9 18.0 
Ireland - 77.1 72.4 67.2 54.6? 45.4 32.1 
Italy - 71.3 61.1 57.6 46.1 46.3 36.4 
Netherlands - 77.2 66.0 57.6? 42.1? 34.3 22.0 
Norway - - 34.0 26.8 20.8? 19.6 17.2 
Portugal - - 45.2? 35.7 30.6? 24.8 19.4 
Spain - - 69.8 66.7 53.1 44.5 31.7 
Sweden 44.5 33.5 18.9 13.0? 9.3? 13.8 14.7 
UK - - - 33.3 27.0 26.0 23.2 
Australia - 55.4 48.6 46.5 33.4 30.8 28.0 
Canada - - 41.5 34.4 24.6 24.1 18.4 
Japan 44.1 46.2 43.8 40.5 35.8 34.8 31.9 
US 55.6 49.7 37.7 32.9 26.0 24.4 24.7 
 
? refers to a significant break in the series. 
 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, Table C, various issues.  OECD Labour Market Statistics. 
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TABLE 11 
 
Percentage Marginal Tax Rates Facing Married Women 
 
 Husband 100% AW 
Wife 0% AW 
Two children 
Husband 100% AW 
Wife 67% AW 
Two children 
 1981-86 1996-99 1981-86 1996-99 
     
Austria - 0 - 43.0 
Belgium 44.5 48.2 52.3 55.9 
Denmark 41.5 48.0 30.9 51.3 
Finland 0 0 32.3 45.1 
France 17.9 24.4 24.1 27.3 
Germany 39.0 49.5 40.2 53.1 
Ireland 7.1 0 70.1 30.0 
Italy 8.6 9.5 28.0 34.0 
Netherlands 34.4 5.1 34.1 45.5 
Norway 20.5 13.5 32.5 35.8 
Portugal 11.2 15.7 16.6 25.8 
Spain 0 0 21.3 29.8 
Sweden 0 0 29.8 38.8 
Switzerland 26.6 22.3 33.3 30.7 
UK 0 0 38.4 33.3 
Japan 21.9 18.4 18.1 16.3 
USA 30.8 31.6 30.8 29.9 
 
These include household income and social security taxes less cash transfers.  
 
AW = Average Wage.  Computed using the tax rules of each country by looking a the 
tax paid on an annual income for the wife of X and of 1+X  where X is 0% or 67% 
of the average annual earnings of production workers, given the husband earns 100% 
of the average annual earnings of production workers.  Author’s calculations based on 
an OECD template. 
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TABLE 12 
 
Participation Rate of Women (25-54) in the OECD (1981-2001) 
 
 Panel Regressions 
    
 1. 2. 3. 
    
Marginal Tax Rate, 
Spouse (100,0) 
-0.18 
(4.2) 
-0.14 
(3.7) 
-0.11 
(3.4) 
    
Marginal Tax Rate, 
Spouse (1000,67) 
-0.15 
(5.1) 
-0.21 
(6.6) 
-0.11 
(3.8) 
    
Average Tax 
Wedge 
0.013 
(0.3) 
0.24 
(4.3) 
0.13 
(2.4) 
    
Employment 
Protection (index 
0-5) 
-0.050 
(4.8) 
-0.070 
(6.2) 
-0.065 
(6.3) 
Union Density -0.23 
(4.7) 
-0.090 
(2.3) 
0.030 
(0.8) 
    
Business Sector 
Labour 
Productivity (log) 
 0.31 
(6.5) 
-0.21 
(4.5) 
    
Male 
unemployment rate 
(log) 
 0.025 
(3.7) 
-0.026 
(4.4) 
    
Real Expenditure 
on cash benefits per 
child (0-14) 
  0.032 
(4.6) 
    
Real Expenditure 
on parental leave 
per child (0-3) 
  0.022 
(4.2) 
    
Real Expenditure 
on family services 
per child (0-14) 
  0.033 
(3.5) 
    
Countries 17 17 17 
Observations 315 283 283 
Year dummies √ √ √ 
Country dummies √ √ √ 
2R  0.94 0.96 0.97 
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Notes:  Marginal tax rates: As in Table 11. 
 
Average tax wedge: This is the average labour tax rate, the sum of the average payroll, income and consumption tax rates.  
Computed by taking the average tax rates from OECD Taxing Wages Statistics including employers’ social security contributions 
and adding the average consumption tax rate ((Indirect taxes – subsidies) ÷ consumption) from OECD National Accounts. 
 
Employment protection: An Index referring to regular employment.  Details of its computation are variable in OECD 
Employment Outlook, 2004, Chapter 2.  The numbers may be found in the first three columns of Table 2.A2.4. 
 
Union density : ratio of employed union members to employees.  See Nickell et al. 2005, p. 23. 
 
Business sector labour productivity : output (in constant US dollars) per worker in the business sector.  OECD male 
unemployment rate : OECD Labour Market Statistics. 
 
Real expenditure on cash benefits: Annual public expenditure in real dollars on family cash benefits per child age 0-14 times 10-3. 
 
Real expenditure on parental leave: Annual public expenditure in real dollars on maternity and parental leave per child aged 0-3 
times 10-3. 
 
Real expenditure on family services: Annual public expenditure in real dollars on family services per child aged 0-14 time 10-3. 
 
These final three variables were most kindly provided by Sakiko Tanaka.  (See Tanaka, 2005) 
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TABLE 13 
 
Women’s Part-Time Work: Voluntary or Involuntary, 1996 
 
 1. 2.  
    
 Percentage of 
working women 
who are part-time 
Percentage of 
working women 
who are voluntarily 
part-time 
(2.÷1.) x 100 
    
Austria 21.7 21 97 
Belgium 32.1 21 65 
Denmark 24.2 18 74 
Finland 11.3 6 53 
France 24.1 15 62 
Germany 29.9 27 90 
Ireland 26.4 17 64 
Italy 20.9 11 53 
Netherlands 55.5 45 81 
Portugal 15.1 5 33 
Spain 16.2 8 49 
Sweden 23.5 20 85 
UK 41.4 30 72 
Australia 40.0 26 65 
Canada 28.9 17 59 
Japan 36.7 37 100 
US 20.2 10 50 
 
Note. In Europe voluntary includes women who say they did not want to work FT 
and did not say they worked PT because of education, sickness/disability or 
because they were unable to find a FT job.  Outside Europe, the definition is 
broader. 
 
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook, 2001, Table 4.8. 
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TABLE 14 
 
Unemployment (Standardised Rate) % 
 
 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-895 1996-99 2000-1 2002 2004 
          
Austria 1.6 1.4 1.4 3.1 3.6 4.3 3.7 4.2 4.5 
Belgium 2.3 2.3 5.8 11.2 8.4 9.2 6.8 7.3 7.8 
Denmark 2.2 1.7 4.1 7.0 8.1 5.3 4.4 4.6 5.4 
Finland 1.4 2.4 4.1 5.1 9.9 12.2 9.4 9.1 8.9 
France 1.5 2.3 4.3 8.9 10.5 11.5 9.0 8.9 9.7 
Germany (W) 0.8 0.8 2.9 6.1 5.6 7.4 6.4 6.8 7.7 
Ireland 5.1 5.3 7.3 13.8 14.7 8.7 4.0 4.4 4.5 
Italy 3.5 4.2 4.5 6.7 8.1 9.9 8.4 7.4 6.9 
Netherlands 0.9 1.7 4.7 10.0 7.2 4.5 2.6 2.8 4.6 
Norway 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.4 5.2 3.8 3.6 3.9 4.4 
Portugal 2.3 2.5 5.5 7.8 5.4 6.0 4.1 5.0 6.7 
Spain 2.4 2.7 4.9 17.6 19.6 19.4 13.5   
Spain*      15.8 11.0 11.4 10.8 
Sweden 1.2 1.6 1.6 2.3 5.1 8.6 5.5 4.9 6.4 
Switzerland 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.8 2.8 3.5 2.6 3.2 4.4 
UK 2.6 3.1 4.8 10.5 8.8 6.8 5.2 5.1 4.6 
Australia 2.5 1.9 4.6 7.7 8.7 7.9 6.5 6.4 5.5 
Canada 5.5 4.7 6.9 9.7 9.5 8.7 7.0 7.7 7.2 
Japan 1.4 1.3 1.8 2.5 2.5 3.9 4.9 5.4 4.7 
New Zealand 0.0 0.3 0.7 4.7 8.1 6.8 5.7 5.2 3.9 
USA 5.5 4.3 6.4 7.6 6.1 4.8 4.4 5.8 5.5 
 
Notes  
As far as possible, these numbers correspond to the OECD standardised rates and confirm to the ILO definition.  The exception here is Italy 
where we use the US Bureau of Labour Statistics “unemployment rates on US concepts”.  In particular we use the correction to the OECD 
standardised rates made by the Bureau prior to 1993.  This generates a rate which is 1.6 percentage points below the OECD standardised rate 
after 1993.  The rates referred to in Spain* refer to recently revised ILO rates.  For earlier years we use the data reported in Layard et al. (1991)).  
For later years we use the OECD Employment Outlook (2005, Table A). 
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TABLE 15 
 
Minimum Annual leave Legislation a 
 
 1964 1984 1992 2003c Public 
Holidays 
(1991) (days) 
      
Austria 2 4 5 5 (5) 13 
Belgium 2 4 4 4 10-13.5 
Denmark 3 5 5 5 (6) 10 
Finland 3 4 5 4 (5) 5-9 
France 3 5 5 5 (5) 11 
Germany 2.5 3 3 4 (5.8) 11 + 4 regional 
Ireland 2 3 3 4 (4) 8 
Italy 0b 0b 0b 4 (5.6) 11 
Netherlands 2.5 3 4 4 (6.2) 9 
Norway 3 4.2 4.2 4.2 (5) 10 
Portugal 1 3-4.4 3-4.4 4.4 (4.9) 13 
Spain 1 5 5 4.2 13 
Sweden 4 5 5.4 5 (6.6) 9 
Switzerland 1 2 4 na 8 
UK 0 0 0 4 (4.9) 8 + 3 regional 
Australia 3 4 4 4 9 
Canada 1 2 2 na 10 
Japan 1 1 2 na 12 
NZ 2 3 3 na 11 
US 0 0 0 0 10 
 
a. In weeks.  If legislation is in days, divide by 5. 
b. Right to paid annual leave established in legislation but length determined by collective 
bargaining 
c. In parentheses is the average collectively agreed annual paid leave. 
 
Sources: OECD (1994) Jobs Study II, Table 6.12. European Industrial Relations Observatory. 
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TABLE 16 
 
Part-Time Employment as a Proportion of Total Employment (%) 
 
 1973 1979 1983 1990 1995 2003 
       
Austria 6.4 7.6 8.4 - 11.1 13.6 
Belgium 3.8 6.0 8.1 13.5 14.5 17.7 
Denmark  22.7 23.8 19.2 16.7 15.8 
Finland  6.7 8.3 7.6 8.4 11.3 
France 5.9 8.2 9.7 12.2 12.5 12.9 
Germany 10.1 11.4 12.6 13.4 14.2 19.6 
Ireland  5.1 6.6 10.0 13.0 18.8 
Italy 6.4 5.3 4.6 8.9 10.5 12.0 
Netherlands  16.6 21.4 28.2 27.3 34.5 
Norway 20.8 25.3 29.0 21.8 27.5 21.0 
Portugal  7.8  7.6 8.6 10.0 
Spain    4.6 7.1 7.8 
Sweden  23.6 24.8 14.5 15.1 14.1 
Switzerland    22.1 23.8 25.12 
UK 16.0 16.4 19.4 20.1 22.2 23.3 
Australia 11.9 15.9 17.5 22.6 30.8 27.9 
Canada 9.7 12.5 15.4 17.0 18.6 18.9 
Japan 13.9 15.4 16.2 19.2 21.3 26.0 
NZ 11.2 13.9 15.3 19.7 21.5 22.3 
US 15.6 16.4 18.4 14.1 13.3 13.2 
 
Source:  OECD 
 
Note 
Part-time employment refers to persons who usually work less than 30 hours per week in their main 
job. 
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TABLE 17 
 
Sickness and Maternity/Paternity Benefit Recipients as a Percentage of Employees 
 
 Sickness benefit Maternity/Paternity 
benefit 
Total 
 1980 1999 1980 1999 1980 1999 
       
Austria 3.8 2.9 1.8 2.9 5.6 5.8 
Belgium 2.4 1.8 0.2 0.4 2.6 2.2 
Denmark 5.8 6.0 0.6 2.1 6.4 8.1 
France 3.7 3.0 0.8 3.2 4.5 6.2 
Germany 4.1 3.8 0.3 0.3 4.4 4.1 
Ireland 5.8 3.0 0.4 0.4 6.2 3.4 
Netherlands 6.2 4.8 0 0 6.2 4.8 
Spain 0.5 0.7 0 0 0.5 0.7 
Sweden 6.1 7.9 2.0 2.8 8.1 10.7 
UK 1.8 1.3 0.5 0.4 2.3 1.7 
Australia 1.6 2.1 0 0 1.6 2.1 
Canada 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.9 
Japan 3.1 1.8 0.1 0.2 3.2 2.0 
NZ 0.7 2.1 0 0 0.7 2.1 
US 2.8 2.9 0 0 2.8 2.9 
 
Sources:   Benefit recipients/Population of working age, OECD Employment  
Outlook, 2003, Table 4.A1.1. Employment/Population, OECD Labour Market 
Statistics. 
Divide the former by the latter. 
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TABLE 18 
 
Estimates of Weeks per Year for Employees accounted for by Sickness and 
Maternity/Paternity Leave 
 
 
 Proportion of a 
employees who are 
sickness  or 
maternity benefit 
recipients time 52 
Other absences b 
(table 2) 
Absences due to c 
sickness and 
maternity 
    
 1999 2002 2002 
    
Austria 3.0 4.0 5.2 
Belgium 1.1 2.3 4.2 
Denmark 4.2 4.3 3.6 
France 3.2 4.7 3.8 
Germany 2.1 4.7 2.8 
Ireland 1.8 0.4 2.0 
Netherlands 2.5 2.4 4.4 
Spain 0.4 (1.7) 2.4 
Sweden 5.6 3.7 7.6 
UK 0.9 1.2 3.2 
Australia 1.1 - - 
Canada 0.5 - - 
Japan 1.0 - - 
NZ 1.1 - - 
US 1.5 2.4 0.9 
 
Sources:  a)  Table 17, final column x 52/100  
 b)  Table 2, column 5 
 c)  OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Table 1.5.  Weeks of absence due to sickness  
  and maternity are derived by doubling the last column of Table 1.5.  This adjustment  
  reflects the OECD best guess of the correction for under-reporting.  For the US, we  
  take the number from Alesina et al. (2005), Table 3. 
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TABLE 19 
 
Annual Hours Worked by the Employed in the OECD (1981-99) 
 
 Dependent Variable, log (hours)  
    
 1. 2. 3. 
    
Marginal tax rate, 
spouse (100,0) 
0.086 
(2.1) 
0.17 
(4.1) 
0.14 
(4.0) 
    
Marginal tax rate, 
spouse (100,67) 
-0.072 
(2.7) 
-0.16 
(3.8) 
-0.14 
(3.7) 
    
Average tax wedge -0.16 
(3.4) 
-0.033 
(0.6) 
-0.12 
(2.4) 
    
Employment-
protection (index, 0-5) 
-0.012 
(1.2) 
-0.12 
(3.5) 
-0.038 
(1.2) 
    
Marginal tax rate, 
single (100) 
0.055 
(1.9) 
0.062 
(1.9) 
-0.021 
(0.7) 
    
Union density 0.11 
(2.3) 
0.21 
(2.5) 
0.21 
(1.8) 
    
Ln ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
percentile
percentile
th
th
10
50  
 0.70 
(7.4) 
0.79 
(9.9) 
    
Ln ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
percentile
percentile
th
th
50
90  
 0.22 
(2.2) 
0.17 
(2.0) 
    
Business sector labour 
productivity (log) 
  0.37 
(7.3) 
    
Male unemployment 
rate (log) 
  0.013 
(2.0) 
    
Countries 17 15 15 
Observations 276 177 186 
Year dummies √ √ √ 
Country dummies √ √ √ 
2R  0.94 0.94 0.97 
Notes  
Marginal tax rate, single.  Computed using tax rules by looking at taxes paid by a single person on an annual income of 
x and of 1+x  where x is the annual average earnings of production workers. 
50/10, 90/50 percentile ratios in the earnings distribution.  OECD. 
Other variables are defined in Table 12. 
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TABLE 20 
 
Total Labour Input 
 
 Weekly hours worked per person of working age 
        
 1964 1970 1973 1983 1990 2004 % change from 
1983 (1973) 
        
Austria      19.8  
Belgium    17.8 17.7 17.7 -0.6 
Denmark    22.0 21.1 21.3 -1.5 
Finland 28.8 26.8 25.8 25.7 25.2 22.4 -12.8 (-13.2) 
France  24.4 23.4 19.4 18.8 17.4 -10.3 (-25.6) 
Germany  25.2 24.7 20.2 19.3 18.0 -10.9 (-27.1) 
Ireland    19.1 19.1 20.7 8.4 
Italy  18.7 18.9 17.4 16.8 17.5 0.6 (-7.4) 
Netherlands   18.7 15.3 16.8 18.4 20.3 (-1.6) 
Norway   22.3 21.1 20.1 19.8 -6.2  (11.2) 
Portugal     24.0 22.1  
Spain    17.3 18.2 21.4 23.7 
Sweden 25.2 24.1 23.2 23.1 24.9 22.4 -3.0 (-3.4) 
Switzerland      23.2  
UK   26.4 21.2 24.6 23.3 9.9 (-11.7) 
Australia    22.3 24.4 24.3 9.0 
Canada   22.6 21.4 23.8 24.4 14.0 (8.0) 
Japan   30.0 28.6 26.8 23.6 -17.5 (-21.3) 
NZ     23.5 25.8  
US 24.0 23.8 24.1 23.6 25.8 25.0 5.9 (3.7) 
 
Source:  Based on Tables 3 and 4.  Annual hours ÷ 52 x employment rate. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Table 1 
 
Alternative to Table 2 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
     
Other Absences   Average 
weekly hours 
by those in 
work 
Annual weeks 
worked by 
those in work 
(52-3-4) and 
(annual 
hours) 
Holidays 
and 
vacation 
weeks Total 
 
Of which 
sickness/maternity
      
Austria 38.4 41.5 (1594) 7.2 3.3 2.6 
Belgium 36.3 42.0 (1525) 7.1 2.9 2.1 
Denmark 36.3 40.7 (1477) 7.4 3.9 1.8 
Finland 38.8 40.6 (1575) 7.0 4.4 2.1 
France 36.2 42.3 (1531) 7.0 2.7 1.9 
Germany 36.5 42.0 (1533) 7.8 2.2 1.4 
Ireland 36.3 44.7 (1623) 5.7 1.6 1.0 
Italy 37.4 42.0 (1571) 7.9 2.1 1.0 
Netherlands 31.8 40.6 (1291) 7.5 3.9 2.2 
Norway 37.3 39.6 (1477) 6.5 5.9 3.6 
Portugal 40.4 43.7 (1765) 7.3 1.7 1.2 
Spain 38.8 43.3 (1680) 7.0 1.7 1.6 
Sweden 38.1 39.2 (1494) 6.8 6.0 3.8 
Switzerland 37.5 43.3 (1628) 6.0 2.6 1.1 
UK 38.2 42.1 (1608) 6.5 3.4 1.6 
US 39.4 46.2 (1820) 3.9 1.9 1.0 
 
Sources:  Column 1.  OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Table 1.5. US, Alesina et al. (2005) 
 Table 3. 
Column 3.  OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Table 1.5. US, Alesina et al. (2005)  
Table 3 
Column 4.  OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Table 1.5, cols. (h) + (i).  US, Alesina et 
al. (2005), Table 3, col. 5. 
 
This table is based on a different method of computing annual weeks worked. 
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Appendix Table 2 
 
Another Alternative to Table 2 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
     
Other Absences  Ave. weekly 
hours by 
those in work 
Annual 
weeks 
worked by 
those in work 
(52-3-4) and 
(annual 
hours) 
Holidays and 
vacation 
weeks Total Of which 
sickness/maternity
      
Austria 38.4 39.1 (1501) 7.2 5.9 5.2 
Belgium 36.3 39.9 (1448) 7.1 5.0 4.2 
Denmark 36.3 38.9 (1408) 7.4 5.7 3.6 
Finland 38.8 38.5 (1494) 7.0 6.5 4.2 
France 36.2 40.4 (1462) 7.0 4.6 3.8 
Germany 36.5 40.6 (1473) 7.8 3.6 2.8 
Ireland 36.3 43.7 (1586) 5.7 2.6 2.0 
Italy 37.4 41.0 (1533) 7.9 3.1 2.0 
Netherlands 31.8 38.4 (1221) 7.5 6.1 4.4 
Norway 37.3 36.0 (1343) 6.5 9.5 7.2 
Portugal 40.4 41.8 (1689) 7.3 2.9 2.4 
Spain 38.8 41.7 (1618) 7.0 3.3 3.2 
Sweden 38.1 35.4 (1349) 6.8 9.8 7.6 
Switzerland 37.5 42.3 (1586) 6.0 3.7 2.2 
UK 38.2 40.5 (1547) 6.5 5.0 3.2 
US  39.4 45.2 (1781) 3.9 2.9 2.0 
 
Sources:  Columns 1. and 3.  As previous Table. 
Columns 4. and 5.  OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Table 1.5 cols. (h) + (i) + (j) and 2 
x col. (j). US, Alesina et al. (2005), Table 3 col. 3 + 2 x col. 5 and 2 x col. 5.   
 
In this table, the survey data on sickness and maternity are doubled.  This is an adjustment 
suggested by OECD staff.  In our view, some of these numbers seem implausible. 
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Endnotes 
 
1. Thus, they work more hours per year, on average, than workers in any other OECD country 
aside from the Czech Republic, Greece, Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Republic (OECD, 2005, 
Table F).  However US annual hours are of the same order of magnitude as those in 
Australia and New Zealand. 
 
2. This, of course, refers only to market work. It is sometimes argued that a great deal of 
market activity in some countries is replicated by non-market activities in others, partly for 
tax reasons.  For example, far more time in Germany is spent on food preparation in the 
home than in the US, where a far higher proportion of food expenditure is in restaurants (see 
Freeman and Schettkat, 2001).  However, the data reported in Alesina et al. (2005), Table 
17, indicates  that the Germans spend much less time in the home on child care and 
housework than Americans and that they spend more or less equal amounts of time on 
leisure activities. 
 
3. Labour productivity may be affected by changes in female participation, and unemployment 
rates may easily be influenced by omitted factors which also affect participation. 
 
4. Annual hours refers to the hours worked in a year by workers who work for the whole year 
(or full year equivalent workers).  They may work part-time, however.  Also, it refers to 
hours actually worked, not hours paid for. 
 
5. Perhaps because, if jobs are secure, unauthorised absence is less likely to be punished by job 
loss. 
 
6. Bowles and Park (2005) provide a formal model of this effect. 
 
7. In Koeniger (2004), Table 3, columns (5), (6), we find the coefficient on union density is -
0.32 in the 90/50 equation and -0.13 in the 50/10 equation.  So the total effect of union 
density Table 19, column 2 is 0.21 – (0.32 x 0.22 + 0.13 x 0.70) = 0.21 – 0.16 = 0.05. 
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